A US Iraqi Base, Here On Out

Published on Friday, December 30, 2005 by the Providence Journal (Rhode Island)

by Daniel Widome

SAN FRANCISCO -- WHEN PRESIDENT BUSH was re-elected, in 2004, many figured that the debate over the invasion of Iraq had been settled. A majority of Americans had voted for Bush and, it was assumed, expressed their opinion that the war was justified. But recent weeks have proven this assumption wrong. Despite the announcement of modest troop withdrawals in the wake of the Iraqi elections, U.S. casualties mount. Instead of debating current policy alone, many still question the invasion itself. Wasted breath, cry some. Regardless of the invasion's merits, the United States is in Iraq now: Today's debate must focus on the future, not the past. Bush himself re-energized this argument through his series this month of uncharacteristically forthright speeches. He neglected to mention, however, that the road to success in Iraq passes squarely through the very rationales for the invasion itself. In the shadow of 9/11, the Bush administration offered a slew of reasons to invade Iraq. But the logic behind each rationale seemed tenuous and forced. More damning, however, was the post-invasion evidence that the administration had perhaps exaggerated its arguments to get the war it wanted. If the ostensible reasons to invade were exaggerated or inconclusive, why did the administration really want to invade Iraq? This is best answered by imagining a Russian matryoshka doll -- the wooden figure that contains a smaller copy of itself, which contains a still smaller copy, and so forth. Each reason for war on Iraq can be removed to reveal a less presentable one. The external argument -- and the one that could bear both public and United Nations scrutiny -- was Iraqi possession of illicit weapons of mass destruction. Insufficiently proven to justify invasion on its own, this external rationalization must be removed to reveal the pro-invasion argument based on regime change. The regime-change rationale could be used publicly but not at the United Nations, for Saddam Hussein -- like every other dictator -- had violated no Security Council resolution just by being an odious leader. Likewise, if the administration had originally intended to promote democracy in Iraq, its initial post-invasion plans would have included more than a simple reliance on Ahmed Chalabi. Peeling away these layers of rationalization reveals the nub of the pro-invasion argument: pure geopolitics. This argument, unlike the others, could not be made publicly to justify a war of choice. It was based on a belief long held by many in the Bush administration that the United States had to retain its global supremacy, and that force would have to be used to defeat any challenge to such supremacy. Invading Iraq affirmed U.S. power in a vitally important part of the world; everything else was ancillary to this central cause. Positioned between Iran, Syria and Saudi Arabia, Iraq was a perfect place to plant the U.S. flag. Nurtured during the 1990s, empowered upon Bush's initial election, and enacted in the uncertain months after 9/11, this was the only consistent rationale for invasion of Iraq. Practically speaking, today this geopolitical argument means permanent basing rights. The recently announced U.S. troop reductions may well be followed by further, piecemeal reductions, but the Iraqis have received no indication that U.S. forces will ever completely leave their country. The debate over withdrawal timetables is thus almost ludicrous. Fundamentally, the United States invaded Iraq to stay in Iraq; upon arrival, we never had any intention of leaving. U.S. forces will remain, stationed at Saddam's own former military bases, ready to deter challenges to U.S. supremacy and to project power in a chronically unstable corner of the globe. This takes us to today, when the debate over invasion rationales can illuminate the one over occupation problems. The United States must refute its root cause for invasion and disavow any intention of permanent bases in Iraq. Various administration officials have previously muttered words loosely to this effect, but never to an Iraqi audience, and never while addressing the apparent contradiction of the so-called enduring military facilities being built in Iraq. To be effective, a genuine disavowal would have to be backed by genuine intent. It wouldn't solve Iraq's problems overnight, but it would be an important first step. It would place any withdrawal timetable firmly in Iraqis' hands, making it truly contingent upon their own political and security development. Withdrawal would become something desired by the United States, not something deferred. More important, such a disavowal could raise the level of trust between the United States and the international community. Just as Americans questioned the administration's invasion rationales, so did the world, and so do Iraqis today. A little honesty could help not only Iraq but also our own, sagging international reputation. Alas, no disavowal will come. The Bush administration will never renounce permanent bases in Iraq, for doing so would undermine its root rationale for invasion. We could expect no better from a Democrat, either; the geopolitical prize of ready-made bases in Iraq is hard to resist, no matter one's political affiliation. That's the funny thing about U.S. power. When you're the one wielding it, it doesn't seem so bad after all. Daniel Widome, an occasional contributor, is former editor in chief of the Brown University Journal of World Affairs and a San Francisco-based foreign-policy analyst. © Copyright 2005 Providence Journal